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Abstract
With aid budgets shrinking in richer countries and more money for healthcare
becoming available from domestic sources in poorer ones, the rhetoric of value
for money or improved efficiency of aid spending is increasing. Taking
healthcare as one example, we discuss the need for and potential benefits of
(and obstacles to) the establishment of a national institute for aid effectiveness.
In the case of the UK, such an institute would help improve development
spending decisions made by DFID, the country’s aid agency, as well as by the
various multilaterals, such as the Global Fund, through which British aid monies
is channelled. It could and should also help countries becoming increasingly
independent from aid build their own capacity to make sure their own resources
go further in terms of health outcomes and more equitable distribution. Such an
undertaking will not be easy given deep suspicion amongst development
experts towards economists and arguments for improving efficiency. We argue
that it is exactly   needs matter that those who make spendingbecause
decisions must consider the needs not being met when a priority requires that
finite resources are diverted elsewhere. These chosen unmet needs are the
true costs; they are lost health. They   be considered, and should bemust
minimised and must therefore be measured. Such exposition of the trade-offs
of competing investment options can help inform an array of old and newer
development tools, from strategic purchasing and pricing negotiations for
healthcare products to performance based contracts and innovative financing
tools for programmatic interventions.
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Aid is wasted
Up to 40% of healthcare spending is wasted according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO; (World Health Organization, 2010)). 
A recent report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development puts healthcare waste – defined broadly as over-
utilisation of technologies, unwarranted hospital admissions, cor-
ruption and inefficient pharmaceutical markets – at 20% (OECD 
2017). WHO analysis suggests that even the poorest or most fragile 
states in Sub Saharan Africa rely on external funding for less than 
a quarter of their total healthcare spending, and in all bar a handful 
the trend shows a rising domestic over foreign spending (Soucat, 
2017). By implication, a lot of healthcare aid money does not 
buy health, while even the world’s poorest countries increasingly 
finance their healthcare systems (whether wastefully or efficiently) 
out of extremely limited domestic resources.
None of this means that more external money for development is 
now unimportant, but what matters, at least as much as the amount 
of aid, is what Glassman (2015) calls the “priorities ditch”: a dearth 
of investment in governance know-how for setting spending pri-
orities locally, and in better incentives that link aid investment to 
development results, in a context-sensitive and hence more effec-
tive manner (Glassman & Chalkidou, 2012). There are lots of 
things donors can do, but don’t do, to fill this governance gap and 
to create the capacities (both internally and within countries) for 
wise spending, and, where countries are within reach of the Sus-
tainable Development Goals, to smooth a transition to a world less 
dependent on aid.
Filling the priorities ditch
Given today’s aid scepticism in major funding nations, credible 
mechanisms that actually deliver better development outcomes – 
whether poverty reduction, health, sanitation, nutrition, education, 
upholding of human rights – for the poorest and most vulnerable 
people must surely be our priority. The dramatic proposed cuts in 
the USAID budget (Konyndyk, 2017) and the reluctant UK commit-
ment to a 0.7% GDP aid spending target reflect public scepticism 
of the return-on-investment of aid. The numerous channels through 
which UK aid is distributed also suggest multiple objectives and 
a lack of strategic purpose and coordination: the Department for 
International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, UK Trade, Research Councils, Commonwealth Develop-
ment Corporation, Ministry of Defence, etc. The scepticism is 
shared by some sections of the UK popular media and Parliament. 
It ought to be possible to moderate such scepticism: a loud and 
clear commitment by the US and UK administrations to ensur-
ing that money spent on aid is money well spent, good value for 
those giving and for those receiving. Emphasis on analysis, 
evidence and performance, rather than evidence-free advocacy 
and non-performance-linked targets, may be a win-win for both 
donors and recipients of aid (Chalkidou et al., 2017). But this 
will require a much sharper focus within major global donors and 
– most importantly – in-country training in the necessary analytical 
skills and in-country infrastructure for recipients, so that competent 
agencies and ministerial departments are created and sustained 
(Li et al., 2017).
To make the case, it is no use relying solely on emotional case-by-case 
appeals to “doing the right thing” or on a parade of advocacy-friendly 
global statistics. Instead, before any funds are committed, donor 
countries should insist that the necessary capacity in recipient 
countries is brought into being to ensure that only cost-effective 
investments are considered in the first place. Mere effectiveness 
is not enough. The only relevant kind of cost-effectiveness is that 
determined by the social values and development objectives (better 
health, better education, and so on) in the country, the budget it 
proposes, and the associated realistic cost-effectiveness threshold, 
above which not a single significant investment should be made 
without very compelling reasons. A serious and sustained institu-
tionalised effort is needed to analyse and publish every significant 
aid programme’s return-on-investment, monitoring and evaluating 
it both during implementation and in the longer run. Ian Mitchell of 
the Center for Global Development proposes that any bilateral aid 
programme above £10m should be disallowed unless this kind of 
analysis has been done and the proposed investment passes the rel-
evant tests (Mitchell, 2017). He also proposes the establishment of 
NIDE, a National Institute for Development Effectiveness, to play 
this role on behalf of the UK.
NIDE: NICE for aid?
Modelled along the lines of the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE), NIDE would be an independent public 
body accountable to the Government, and whose function is to 
assess the value-for-money of overseas development assistance on 
behalf of DFID and other relevant agencies. NIDE would evalu-
ate the value-for-money of investing in aid not only for bilateral 
programmes, but also for monies spent through multilateral agen-
cies – in health aid, such agencies include the Global Fund for 
AIDS, TB and Malaria, UNITAID, and Gavi – where the oppor-
tunities for efficiencies, given the bulk purchasing of commodities 
on behalf of large part of the world, are significant. Indeed, Her 
Majesty’s Government made a start in this direction with last 
September’s Performance Agreement with the Global Fund: 
“Through our membership of the Board of the Global Fund, the 
UK will work to strengthen independent advice and scrutiny of the 
Global Fund to ensure that it is following best practice in seeking 
value for money.” (Department for International Development and 
The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2016). 
What are missing, and what a NICE-for-aid could provide, are 
value-for-money indicators and valid, reliable processes for 
measuring and reporting against them.
NIDE would also determine two other key factors in conjunction 
with government departments of recipient countries. One is the 
nature of criteria other than cost-effectiveness to be deployed to 
inform investment decisions. For health investments, evident can-
didates include the benefits of financial protection that the invest-
ments may enable and the contribution the investment would make 
to reducing the worst inequalities in health. The other factor is the 
cost-effectiveness threshold suitable for each client country, set 
so that when the country eventually absorbs the costs of whatever 
investments the aid has established (for instance, vaccination pro-
grammes), those costs are affordable with domestic resources, and 
in the case of health not the absurdly generous thresholds inherited 
from past WHO priority-setting (Culyer, 2016; Revill et al., 2014). 
NIDE would need also to play a key role in the creation of training 
and capacity-building programmes – targeting a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders ranging policymakers, technical officers, researchers, 
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and the like – and preferably such programmes located in recipient 
countries and preferably ones that also train trainers, thereby avoid-
ing as far as possible excessive ongoing dependence on the UK and 
other high-income countries (Li et al., 2017).
The “NICE-for-aid” idea is not new for public policy, at least not 
in the UK. The What Works Centres claim “a world first” for any 
government to have “…taken a national approach to prioritis-
ing the use of evidence in decision-making.” (Ruiz & Breckon, 
2014). What Works Centres span health (NICE is part of the 
What Works network), crime, education and ageing, but do not 
(yet) cover development. The NIDE proposal simply extends this 
world innovation in public policy to overseas development assist-
ance. This ought to win over domestic aid sceptics by championing 
strong governance and institutions in recipient countries alongside 
rigorous value-for-money assessments – assessments using world 
class skills, which the UK prides itself on and has in abundance 
(Hasan et al., 2015).
NIDE must not be a patronising or culturally imposing exercise. 
The BMGF, Rockefeller and DFID already fund the international 
Decision Support Initiative (iDSI) based at Imperial College. This 
is a multinational, multiprofessional and multidisciplinary initiative 
aiming at improving health resource allocation decisions in low and 
middle income countries (LMICs) using evidence of comparative 
clinical and cost-effectiveness (Chalkidou, et al., 2017). It operates 
by strengthening local capacities for decision-making and prior-
ity-setting, by promoting best practice in analytical and statistical 
methods, and by sharing experiences and results actively through 
its expanding network. iDSI works with the national governments 
or national health insurers of India, South Africa, Ghana, Indone-
sia, Vietnam and China to improve value-for-money in healthcare 
investments. The World Bank is coordinating a Joint Learning 
Network for Universal Health Coverage, which is somewhat broader 
in scope and has recently launched an efficiency collaborative 
with similar objectives to those of iDSI. And whilst demand from 
governments for such support is less evident in low income 
economies, funding channels, such as the Global Fund and 
UNITAID, can play this role. In its market shaping strategy, the 
Global Fund commits to: “…proactively engage with recipients 
to share relevant analyses and information about likely product 
costs and comparative health technology assessments…the GF 
Secretariat...will connect recipients with these resources to inform 
country-driven health technology assessment. Engaging in this 
process can also be an opportunity to build country capacity for 
health technology assessment and how to incorporate this into 
product selection decisions.” (Kanpirom et al., 2017).
NICE for aid: Setting it up
Setting up a NICE-for-aid would hardly be an easy task. There are 
challenges in setting the scope (health, education, other areas of 
social policy, commodities or services, etc.) and in defining (even 
inventing) the methods to be followed for evaluating aid invest-
ment projects both ex ante, and perhaps ex post in monitoring and 
evaluation, where perhaps much of the ODA Research Council 
money could be channelled.
On scope, healthcare spending is an obvious starting point given 
the global drive for universal health coverage – Target 3.8 of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Within healthcare, NIDE should 
seek a broad agreement on the value of evidence and the principles 
according to which evidence would be appraised; on the principles 
for determining value-for-money (economic efficiency); on suitable 
outcome measures and their appropriate uses; and on the principles 
to be used in assessing ethical and distributional issues and their 
integration into Health Technology Assessment (Chalkidou et al., 
2016). NIDE should also make an inventory of the evidence-based 
policy expertise – essentially expertise in evidence generation, 
governance, and policy – that the UK has after the Cochrane 
Collaboration, more than 15 years’ experience of NICE, and 
two decades of Health Technology Assessment. NIDE should 
also liaise with the National Institute of Health Research and the 
Research Councils to develop a research programme that addressed 
important unanswered but researchable questions – ones whose 
answering would enhance NIDE’s effectiveness.
On methods, starting with articulating a Reference Case, that is 
an agreed “gold standard” for conducting and reporting economic 
analyses, to drive better economic evaluations makes sense. iDSI 
already has a Reference Case for health economic evaluations in 
low- and middle-income countries (Wilkinson et al., 2016). A Ref-
erence Case would have two main tasks: first to list the essential 
characteristics of competent research and research reporting, and 
second to list those specific contextual matters that can be resolved 
only in-country. NIDE could usefully revisit the current DFID 
definition of Value for Money (which has little economic content), 
the 4Es framework, which confusingly comprises 3 Es and a fourth 
CE for cost-effectiveness - but inexplicably discusses neither 
opportunity costs nor allocative efficiency (Department for 
International Development, 2011).
NIDE should avoid taking a blinkered approach on the scope of 
economic and epidemiological analyses. They provide useful tools 
for looking at countries transitioning away from aid, to inform, 
for instance, appropriate co-financing levels to maximise return- 
on-investment. Recent work has advanced the field of efficiency 
and performance measurement of whole healthcare systems 
(Smith & Yip, 2016), moving well beyond the NICE approach 
of assessing only individual pharmaceutical products to include 
the analysis of delivery platforms, health system strengthening 
interventions and human resource constraints (van Baal et al., 2017; 
Morton et al., 2016). This is not easy – a recent attempt at deal-
ing with a DFID programmatic intervention on maternal and child 
health in Nigeria as a technology whose value could be assessed 
compared to the next best thing, proved to be incredibly hard 
(Jones, 2017). Hard - but not impossible. Hard - but in fact essential 
if such investments are not to waste aid money. At the very least, 
the Nigeria study threw up areas where more research, empirical or 
methodological, or data collection exercises, or  investment in skills 
were needed.
Data is another important prerequisite for systematically assessing 
the value for money of aid interventions. Systematic assessment is 
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not only valuable for the substantive implications it has for particular 
policy choices; it also identifies data gaps and focuses attention 
on future data collection priorities amongst types of information 
that would make a difference in future investment decisions. Data 
on unit costs (price transparency is one important element of this) 
and resource use (how much does it cost the National Health Insur-
ance of Ghana to treat a stroke?), incidence (how much of the full 
cost falls on private individuals), individual and social preferences 
(reflecting local cultural and religious realities), data on risks (inci-
dence data for most conditions for example are absent for most SSA 
countries) and effect sizes (inevitably based on pragmatic research 
carried out in in-country context; (BOLDER Research Group, 
2016)), treatment of residual uncertainty (for example, where 
data are absent and resort has to be had to modelling and “expert 
opinion”). Such a targeted, decision needs-driven approach to data 
generation, ideally through systems’ own routine mechanisms, need 
not necessarily be complemented by monster demographic health 
surveys, but it would make decisions easier to make, the reasons 
for them clearer, and decision makers more accountable to their 
populations and their donors. NICE has had that very effect in the 
National Health Service (NHS): costing data on technologies and 
services (like reference costs and later diagnosis-related groups) 
became more readily available as NICE used them for informing 
real investment decisions.
The opposition?
NIDE is bound to provoke hostility. If it does things wrong, this will 
be deserved. But let us review a few grounds that would not be good 
grounds for complaint.
It will be said that costs ought not to be considered when setting 
health care priorities (Loewy, 1980). Only need matters. The charge 
is deeply wrong because it is inconsistent. It is exactly because 
needs matter that NIDE must consider the needs not being met when 
a priority requires that resources go elsewhere. These chosen unmet 
needs are the true costs. They are lost health. They must be consid-
ered, and should be minimised (and must therefore be measured).
It will be said that people’s willingness to pay ought not to deter-
mine the priorities in a public health insurance system because of 
the huge inequalities in abilities to pay in most LMICs. Indeed, 
individual willingness ought not to be the determinant. But explicit 
collective willingness to pay is essential, this is most handily 
expressed by a cost-effectiveness threshold and NIDE will have to 
help countries to decide what this should be. The WHO’s 1–3 times 
GDP per capita for health may well have caused more harm than 
good, until its quiet withdrawal by WHO sometime in 2016/17, for 
being overly generous and not nearly country specific enough to 
inform meaningful local spending decisions (Revill et al., 2014; 
Woods et al., 2016). Here is an issue over which one size definitely 
does not fit all. In particular, setting a threshold that is too high 
ensures that it becomes impossible to implement a cost-effective 
programme of care. It ensures that services recommended on its 
basis are unaffordable.
Some will rail against economics and economists, attributing to 
them an indifference to inequities and uncritical worship of market 
solutions. Major figures in global development have attributed 
inequalities in healthcare outcomes and access to economics and 
economics. “Value for money”, “sustainability”, a “minimum 
healthcare package” and “limited resources” are deemed to be too 
un-aspirational and depriving the poor in developing countries 
from services they need, in the name of efficiency (Paul Farmer, 
Who Lives and Who Dies; (Farmer, 2015)). Senior WHO officials 
recently declared any efforts to value benefits of the latest expensive 
on-patent drugs, or “the value of life”, simply “unfeasible”. And 
economists are accused of “institutionalising inequality” and being 
collectively against “access free at the point of delivery”, which 
“kills the soul of an economist” (Richard Horton, The Atlantic, 
2012) (Meyer, 2013). There are of course some economists who 
(still) believe in healthcare markets, consumer supremacy and 
prices as the best proxies for people’s preferences, all ill-suited 
to healthcare and most public policy, but these economists are not 
amongst those who published the Economists’ Declaration on UHC 
(Summers, 2015). True, NIDE must choose its economists well!
None of these objections should stop the UK from improving the 
effectiveness of aid spending, starting with its own investment and 
building on the firm principle that we seek to maximise the impact 
of our aid money on the health of the people we choose to help. If 
DFID were to create a NICE-for-aid it would at a stroke improve 
purchasers’ ability to buy effectively at all levels: from the way 
DFID spends its own money, through bilateral country programmes 
or organisations such as Global Fund, UNITAID and Gavi, as well 
as the WHO and the World Bank, to influencing how the likes of 
the Global Fund or World Bank trust funds contract directly with 
product manufacturers or pass money on to countries for them 
to buy from service providers or product manufacturers. Such an 
approach would give new meaning to “strategic purchasing” or 
“evidence-informed procurement”. It could also inform upstream 
investment decisions made by the like of DFID’s CDC, the UK pri-
vate investment arm, active in South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa.
What would it cost?
It has been estimated that the HTA programme in the UK has much 
more than paid for itself. Implementing just ten reports of the 
hundreds produced, for only one year, and conservatively assum-
ing a yield of just 12% of the total benefit assumed in the HTA 
analyses, generates enough value to cover the running of the 
whole HTA programme for 20 years (Guthrie et al., 2016). That 
is surely a return-on-investment to die for. NICE, one of the most 
expensive of HTA agencies in the world, costs less than 0.05% of 
the NHS budget. A review of priority setting institutions around 
the world found that those countries who do have them, spend less 
than 1/1000 of their resources on them (Glassman et al., 2012). 
Spending less than 0.1% of the total health care budget on decid-
ing how to spend the remaining 99.9% more wisely, improving 
outcomes and access, and building the needed local technical and 
administrative capacity in the process, is surely the definition of a 
good investment.
…and without a NICE-for-aid?
What is the alternative? The risk is that the UK’s (and possibly 
USA’s) aid spending becomes increasingly vulnerable to sceptics, 
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leading to further budget cuts, and further fragmentation between 
spending channels across government departments. The “business 
as usual” approach would rule: serving short term objectives 
rather than maximising long term impact on reducing poverty and 
jeopardising progress toward valuable development goals, such 
as universal health coverage. Without the work a NIDE could do, 
countries transitioning away from aid will become more at risk 
of regressing back to being aid-dependent states, the local intel-
ligent capacity for making good decisions will remain unbuilt, and 
the world risks losing hard won gains towards sustainable global 
development (Glassman & Temin, 2016). It can be done. Let’s do it!
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 15 August 2017Referee Report
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   Daniel A. Ollendorf
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, Boston, MA, USA
This is a thought-provoking piece advocating for a quasi-governmental body that uses evidence-based
principles to ensure the efficient, cost-effective, and equitable use of donor funds for global health
programming directed at low-and-middle income countries. The authors have a wealth of experience in
managing the use of international aid monies in the developing world, and been heavily involved in
training and implementation of health technology methods and decision support techniques in those
settings.  
The authors' work with iDSI is instructive, but readers will benefit from specific examples of the change
brought about the organization's activities. For example, has an evaluation been performed to compare
decision-making processes before and after an iDSI "intervention" in India, Ghana, etc.? I've been
recently made aware of an "affordable cancer drugs list" for India - was this an iDSI effort and how has its
performance contrasted with prior approaches?
Specific comments are also provided below:
Abstract: just a minor grammatical correction. "...is channeled" should be "are channeled."
Pg 3, column 1, paragraph 3: Proposed cuts to USAID and UK commitments certainly reflect
skepticism around return-on-investment, but they also likely reflect the presence of nationalist
politics, and this should be mentioned.
Pg 3, column 2, paragraph 3: This seems an opportune place to introduce budgetary impact
analysis as a companion effort to cost-effectiveness and related efforts. While successful empiric
approaches to setting WTP thresholds will explicitly consider health budgets, BIA can be flexibly
defined to address contingencies common in the developing world (e.g., regime change, changes
in aid vs. domestic funding balance, etc.)
Pg 4, column 1, paragraph 4: Scope challenges are appropriately noted, and I agree that health
spending is a natural starting point. However, it would be useful to see some context around
spending challenges across sectors in the developing vs. developed world.
Page 5, column 1, paragraph 1: It's very difficult for me disentangle the very real data needs
mentioned from the reality of trying to collect data in these settings. An example of a data need that
was simply and efficiently addressed in an LMIC would be helpful. The example of NICE's impact
is less relevant for me given the resources available in the UK.
Page 5, column 2, paragraph 3: It may be premature to do this, but ROI is both about paying for
and sustaining NIDE's activities AND reducing wasteful aid spending. Some estimate of wasteful
spending in the UK, and what percentage reduction would essentially pay for NIDE and increase
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 spending in the UK, and what percentage reduction would essentially pay for NIDE and increase
access to health services in some number of countries would be helpful, even if back-of-the
envelope.
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Yes
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments?
Yes
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
Referee Expertise: Health technology assessment, health economics, real world evidence
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
 07 August 2017Referee Report
doi:10.5256/f1000research.12819.r24492
   Samantha A. Hollingworth
School Pharmacy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
This interesting paper argues the case for an agency potentially named the National Institute for
Development Effectiveness (NIDE) - like a NICE for global health spending by bilateral and multilateral aid
agencies. The authors are well placed to propose this agency given their wealth of experience in this
area. The paper outlines the need, the proposed mechanism, aspects of establishment, and requirements
(e.g. methods and data). The authors pre-emptively outline some potential arguments opposing NIDE and
posit the alternative – what would happen if there was no NIDE? They also outline the anticipated costs.
 
The authors note that this is not a new idea for the UK (p4) and mention the UK Government’s What
Works initiative (some aspects of social policy) and NICE (health technology assessment). It might be
useful to hear more about what other countries or multilateral agencies may have done in this area
especially with regard to establishment, methods, and data sources
 
It appears that health technology assessment would be a major role for NIDE but it may be worth also
considering the costs of scale up and implementing interventions (and not only budget impact analysis).
 
The authors anticipate some hostility. They mention several aspects but this is based on selected
challenges once NIDE would be established. The authors may want to comment on one or two reasons
that some may oppose even the establishment of NIDE. There may be several (and possibly competing)
imperatives for some particular ‘aid’ projects funded by government(s). Concerning the negative
arguments about ‘economics’, one can point to NICE itself for the benefits of ‘economics’!
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 arguments about ‘economics’, one can point to NICE itself for the benefits of ‘economics’!
 
The authors helpfully outline what NIDE might cost but it would be instructive to know the amount of
money spent on aid – at least by the UK. Indeed, the authors hint at the excellent anticipated return on
investment for NIDE - allocation efficiency for aid!
 
Some particular comments:
P3, col 2 - The authors pose some good information requirements. [“What are missing, and what a
NICE-for-aid could provide, are value-for-money indicators and valid, reliable processes for
measuring and reporting against them.”] but it would be helpful to have some more detail on these
vital components.
P4 col 1 - Could mention that the UK government funds the ‘What works’ initiative (for non-UK
audiences).
P4 col 2 - Please define the three Es from the 3E framework.
P5 col 1 - It is unclear about the use of the term ‘incidence’ (presumably of disease or condition)
with its example of (how much of the full cost falls on private individuals)’ which seems related to
funding sources.
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Yes
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments?
Yes
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
Referee Expertise: Health technology assessment and health services research
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
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